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Traditional SMA Planning 
• Bottom up: focus on processes, standards, products 
– Process-based view of technical disciplines 
• Limited coordination between disciplines 
• Value of individual processes hard to characterize 
• Difficult to modify established practices 
 
• Lack of clearly-defined, coherent set of objectives 
based on which adequacy of processes, standards, 
and products can be measured 
Theme of this Talk 
• Net-benefit of activities and decisions derives from 
objectives (and their priority) 
– Similarly: need for integration, value of technology/capability 
 
• Risk is a lack of confidence that objectives will be met 
– Risk-informed decision making requires objectives 
 
• Consideration of objectives is central to recent guidance: 
– Risk Management handbook (NASA/SP-2011-3422) 
– System Safety handbook (NASA/SP-2010-580) 
• Possible definition in terms of objectives: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Programs must establish and maintain confidence 
that objectives are/will be satisfied 
 
Implement system 
in accordance with 
design intent 
Formulate design 
to meet mission 
objectives 
“Safety and Mission Success” 
Limit risk to the 
public, crew, 
mission, assets, 
and environment 
Achieve Safety and Mission Success 
Higher-Level Objectives 
• Top-level objectives*: 
 
 
 
 
 
• Abstract objectives must be broken down into more 
concrete ones (objectives analysis) 
– So they can be asserted with confidence 
– “Dad, let me show you how …”** 
Satisfy Mission 
Technical 
Objectives 
Protect Public, 
Crew, Assets, 
Environment 
Stay Within 
Budget, 
Schedule, 
Resources 
Safety and Mission Success 
**R. Mager 
* e.g., NPR 7123.1 
    and NPD 8700.1 
Concept: Confidence and Risk 
• Risk originates from a lack of confidence 
– Lack of certainty in ability to achieve objectives 
 
 
 
 
• Risk best characterized in terms of: 
– Scenarios by which objectives would not be met 
– Likelihood of those scenarios 
– Consequence (severity) of performance degradation 
• Bonus: probability is a measure of degree of belief (Bayes) 
– This includes P(LOC) and P(LOM) 
 
Confidence 
Tendency displayed by   
uncontrolled processes** 
Degree of belief warranted  
by evidence * 
* e.g., see I. Hacking 
** must itself be known 
Relevance of Objectives to FM Workshop 
• Identification of FM quality attributes: 
Objectives provide a basis for determining relevance 
and completeness of attributes 
 
• Coordination of terminology: 
Requires shared understanding of objectives 
 
• Recognition of Fault Management capabilities: 
Objectives provide outsider perspective on discipline, 
including overlaps with other disciplines 
 
Protect against 
high-risk faults
(primary)
Limit risk due to 
potential for undesired 
FM behavior
Satisfy mission
objectives
Protect public, crew, 
environment, assets
Stay within budget, 
schedule, resource 
constraints
Implement FM within 
available resources
Improve confidence in 
system performance / 
robustness 
(secondary)
FM Benefits FM Costs
Related
FM quality
attributes:
FM
objectives:
Applicability 
Testability
Scalability
...
Heritage
Testability
TRL-levels
...
Observability
...
Scalability
...
Isolated View of FM Objectives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                    Specific to Fault Management capability 
  Not unique to fault management discipline 
Basis for Coherent SMA/FM Objectives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Spacecraft Design] [Spacecraft] 
Formulation Implementation 
Process /  
Manufacturing / 
Assurance Failures 
Desired System 
Operation 
Initiating Event 
System 
Compensates 
Accident /  
Failure 
System Limits 
Consequences 
Consequences 
Low             High 
No Yes 
Yes No 
Accident Timeline 
Unexpected 
Behaviors 
Degradation/ 
Wear-Out 
Commanding 
Errors 
Environmental 
Events 
Invalid Assumptions / 
Models / Analyses 
Vulnerabilities and their Significance  
Design Process 
Failures 
Adapted from:  
NASA/SP-2011-3421 
Breakdown of SMS “Risk” Objectives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• These are common to all disciplines (system safety, 
reliability, fault mgmt, …), though focus may vary 
*E.g., LOC/LOM requirements 
 
Comprehensively 
identify 
vulnerabilities and 
associated risks and 
sensitivities 
Formulate design to 
make likelihood of 
accident initiation as 
low as reasonably 
practicable 
Introduce sufficient 
capability to detect 
and mitigate 
accidents from 
known and unknown 
vulnerabilities such 
that overall risk is 
acceptable* / ALARP 
• “Formulate design to make likelihood of accident initiation as 
low as reasonably practicable” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Disciplines should coordinate to ensure coherence 
• Consistent, logical interfaces, complete, no conflicts 
• Objective structures will be interwoven 
Mapping to Common Discipline Activities 
Discipline Intent of Typical Processes, Standards  
Reliability 
[NS-8729.1] 
Operate EEE parts well within rated operating conditions 
Minimize potential for dielectric discharging; Provide radiation 
shielding;  Provide functional redundancy; … 
Software Assurance 
[ - ] 
[develop using a planned process based, avoid complexity, 
incorporate ability to handle/recover from contingencies] 
System Safety 
[NPR 8715.3] 
Eliminate hazards; Avoid accidents via controls (redundancies, 
procedures, warnings, …) 
Fault Management 
[FM handbook] 
Provide failure detection, fault isolation, failure response 
determination, and failure recovery mechanisms 
Concluding Remarks 
• Set of SMS objectives are common across all disciplines 
 
• SMS objectives and consideration of associated risks is 
proposed as a framework for coordinating activities 
between disciplines  
 
• New system safety paradigm puts greater focus on: 
– Deciding on SMS features in a risk-informed manner 
– Building a case that objectives are met 
– Review of plans and products based on objectives 
 
 
